IMTFE Proceedings Transcripts, 1948, November 8, 1948
File — Box: 17, Folder: 7
Scope and Contents
Judgement, Chapter IV (continued) - Oshima, with German Encouragement, Plans for a Japanese Attack Upon the Pacific Possessions of the Western Powers ; The Reasons for the Downfall of the Abe Cabinet, and the Resumption of a Pro-German Foreign Policy by the Yonai Cabinet ; The Yonai Cabinet Adheres to the Principles of the Basic National Policy Decision ; Japan Attempts to Obtain a Favoured Economic Position in the Netherlands East Indies ; The Yonai Cabinet's Policy of Non-Intervention in the European War Arouses Strong Opposition in Japan ; The Army Supports the Non-Intervention Policy in Order to Complete the Conquest of China and the National Mobilization for War ; Dependence on Foreign Sources of Raw Materials Prevented Japan from Openly Repudiating the Nine-Power Treaty ; Japan Makes New Plans for Industrial Self-Sufficiency in Order to Eliminate Dependence Upon the United States ; The Yonai Cabinet Makes Plans and Preparations for a Southward Advance ; In View of German Success In Europe, and Continued Opposition From the Western Powers, the Pro-German Faction Gains Strength ; Shigemitsu Counsels Arita to Conciliate Western Powers ; Japan Stresses Her Special Interests In the Netherlands East Indies, May 1940 ; Japan Prepares for the Advance to the South; Germany Declares Her Disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies ; Japan Continues to Prepare for a Southward Advance, Disregarding Shigemitsu's Advice ; Japan Makes Renewed Demands Upon French Indo-China; June 1940 ; The Yonai Cabinet, Desiring A Free Hand in Indo-China, Makes Overtures to Germany for Cooperation Against the Western Powers ; Shigemitsu Remains Opposed to Policy of Yonai Cabinet ; Arita Rejects A Proposal for Cooperation with the United States ; Arita Shows that Japan's Policy is Based on Cooperation with Germany Against the Western Powers ; The Pro-German Faction prepares for the Overthrow of the Yonai Cabinet and the Conclusion of an Axis Alliance ; Members of the Pro-German Faction Make Direct Approaches to the German Ambassador ; Political Preparations for the Expected Konoye Cabinet and a One-Party System ; The Pro-German Faction Prepare for a Change in Cabinets, and Plot to Assassinate Prime Minister Yonai and Others ; Germany, by Refusal to Declare Her Policy Towards Japan, Undermines the Yonai Cabinet's Position ; The Emergence of the Plan for An Axis Alliance, Which Would Enable Japan to Dominate East Asia and the South Pacific ; The Reasons for Which the Army Opposed the Yonai Cabinet ; The Army Brings About the Downfall of the Yonai Cabinet ; Kido's Part in the Downfall of the Yonai Cabinetand Selection of Konoye as Premier ; The Formation and Policy of the Second Konoye Cabinet ; The Second Konoye Cabinet Was Resolved to Complete the Military Domination of Japan ; The Liaison Conference and the Manner in Which the Domination of the Military Faction Was Made Complete ; The Tentative Plan for Collaboration with Germany and the Extent of Japanese Planning for the Domination of Greater East Asia ; The Adoption of the Tentative Plan by the Second Konoye Cabinet ; The Second Konoye Cabinet's Policy was Based Upon the National Policy Decision of August 11, 1936 ; The Policy of "Settling the Southern Problem Within Limits" ; Shigemitsu's Views on the "Greater East Asia" Policy ; Matsuoka Proposes to Germany the Terms of Japanese Collaboration with the Axis Powers ; The Detailed Plan for a Tripartite Military Alliance: Four Ministers' Conference, September 4, 1940 ; The Negotiation of the Tripartite Alliance, September 9-11, 1940 ; The Circumstances Surrounding the Conclusion of the Tri-Partite Alliance ; The Terms of the Tripartite Alliance and Assurances Exchanged between Japan and Germany, September 27, 1940 ; The Intentions of Japanese Leaders In Concluding the Tripartite Alliance ; Chapter V. Japanese Aggression Against China; Invasion and Occupation of Manchuria. The China War And Its Phases; Japan's Foothold in Manchuria at the Beginning of the China War ; The Tanaka Cabinet And Its "Positive Policy" ; Agitation In Support of the "Positive Policy" ; The Tsinan Incident ; Murder of Marshal Chang Tsu-Lin ; Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang, The Young Marshal ; Japanese - Chinese Relations Strained ; Resignation of the Tanaka Cabinet ; Reinstatement of the "Friendship Policy" ; Hashimoto and the Cherry Society ; Manchuria As Japan's "Lifeline" ; Assassination of Premier Hamaguchi ; The March Incident ; The Wakatsuki Cabinet Continued the "Friendship Policy" ; The Wanpaoshan Incident ; The Nakamura Incident ; The Army Attitude Stiffened ; Dohihara Investigates ; Foreign Minister Shidehara Also Investigated ; Dohihara Reported to the Army General Staff ; Foreign Minister Shidehara Continued Efforts at Mediation ; Night Maneuvers by the Kwantung Army ; Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang's Commission Returned to Mukden ; Minami's Emissary Went Astray ; The Mukden Incident ; Itagaki Refused to Negotiate ; The Mukden Incident Was Planned ; General Honjo Assumed Command at Mukden ; Minami Sanctioned the Kwantung Army Action ; Colonel Dohihara Returned to Mukden ; Colonel Dohihara As Mayor of Mukden ; Self-Government Guiding Board ; Protests and Assurances ; The October Incident ; Decision to Enthrone Pu-Yi ; Colonel Dohihara Proceeds to Return Pu-Yi ; Enthronement of Pu-Yi Delayed ; The Advance on Chinchow ; The League Appointed A Commission of Inquiry ; The Wakatsuki Cabinet Was Forced to Resign ; The Inukai Cabinet ; Honjo and Itagaki Moved to Execute Honjo's Plan ; Manchuria Was Completely Occupied after the Capture of Chinchow ; Itagaki Completed His Mission and Returned to Mukden ; The Independence Movement Gained In Intensity ; Additional Assurances By Japan ; Hashimoto Objected to this Assurance ; Dohihara Negotiated With General Ma Chan-Shan ; Minami Lectures ; First Invasion of Shanghai ; China Made Another Appeal to the League ; General Ma Bargained with Dohihara
Dates
- November 8, 1948
Language of Materials
From the Collection:
English Japanese
Access Restrictions
The collection is open for research.
Extent
From the Collection: 21 boxes (21 cu.ft.)
Repository Details
Part of the UNM Center for Southwest Research & Special Collections Repository
Contact:
University of New Mexico Center for Southwest Research & Special Collections
University Libraries, MSC05 3020
1 University of New Mexico
Albuquerque NM 87131
505-277-6451
cswrref@unm.edu
University of New Mexico Center for Southwest Research & Special Collections
University Libraries, MSC05 3020
1 University of New Mexico
Albuquerque NM 87131
505-277-6451
cswrref@unm.edu